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Vietnam’s macroeconomic stability in 2024-2026 is facing new challenges as a prolonged export-surplus cycle begins to slow and foreign exchange reserves come under pressure from global volatility. Recent trade data point to a shift that is raising pressure on FX reserves, while large-scale infrastructure plans are increasing the need for foreign currency. In this context, divesting state capital is presented as a necessary step to support macro balances, upgrade strategic infrastructure, and modernize the financial market.
Early 2026 data show a structural change. In the first two months of 2026, Vietnam recorded a trade deficit of nearly $3 billion, compared with a surplus of $1.77 billion in the same period a year earlier. By Q1-2026, the deficit persisted at about $3.6 billion.
The return of a trade deficit is described as potentially cyclical, linked to imports of machinery and equipment for new investment projects. This dynamic is putting direct pressure on foreign exchange reserves. As of September 2025, Vietnam’s FX reserves were around $82.2 billion—up from the 2022 lows but still below the historical peak of $110 billion and viewed as insufficient as a buffer against global currency shocks.
The article also notes that the USD/VND rate is expected to rise by about 3.2%, alongside unpredictable movements in the DXY. It argues that the State Bank of Vietnam’s room for intervention would need to be reinforced with steadier, longer-term foreign currency inflows.
The need for foreign currency is expected to intensify as Vietnam implements the North-South high-speed rail project, with an estimated total investment of $67.34 billion. The article frames this as requiring substantial FX to import high-tech systems, operating technology, locomotives and wagons, and to hire international experts.
To limit additional debt burdens and support national financial security, the government plans to split the project into 17 independent sub-projects to enable a more flexible mobilization mechanism. However, the article states that budget and debt financing resources are limited.
Against this backdrop, privatizing stakes in large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for foreign strategic investors is presented as a way to secure immediate hard currency and ease external debt pressure—described as a “one stone, two birds” approach that can help stabilize the FX balance when import demand rises again.
The article highlights that foreign direct investment remains strong. FDI reached $15.2 billion in Q1-2026, up 42.9% year-on-year, reinforcing Vietnam’s attractiveness to investors.
However, to finance public infrastructure at the scale of national ambitions, it argues that mobilizing capital through privatization of key SOEs is the most effective route to convert static state capital into dynamic assets and generate broader economic spillovers.
For decades, SOEs played a leading role but faced bottlenecks in productivity, innovation, and transparency. A key policy shift is attributed to the January 6, 2026 adoption of Politburo Resolution 79-NQ/TW.
According to the article, the resolution changes state capital management by moving away from concentrating on owning a large number of enterprises and instead focusing on strategic, catalytic sectors such as smart urban infrastructure, public transport, and core technology industries.
The new mechanism allows SOEs to use the entire proceeds from privatization and divestment for capital increases or to form incentive funds and innovation funds. The article argues this can create intrinsic motivation for firms to privatize non-core business areas and redeploy resources into high-tech, high-value-added activities, helping reduce inefficiency from sprawling, unproductive investments.
The article cites lessons from privatizations including Vinamilk and Sabeco. It states that before stronger private and foreign participation, these firms performed well but were constrained by cumbersome administrative approval processes that slowed market decisions.
After the state’s exit, governance structures are described as becoming fully professionalized, with improvements in ROE, net profit margin, and product innovation. The article also attributes performance gains to foreign participation, which it says brings capital alongside modern governance, global distribution networks, and advanced production technologies.
Overall, it argues that privatization is not the loss of national assets but the optimization of national asset value, noting that a remaining government stake in a well-managed, market-driven enterprise may hold greater value than full ownership of a sluggish, unproductive company.
Privatization has been slowed in part by valuation complexity, especially land-use valuation. The article points to the 2024 Land Law and the application of annual land pricing from 2026 onward, intended to address violations and waste in privatization.
While aligning land prices with market values is described as an inevitable trend, it can complicate enterprise valuation and may raise corporate costs. The article argues that the purpose is to ensure fairness and prevent state asset erosion.
It also states that as the land-law framework becomes more transparent under the 2024 Land Law, foreign investors may feel more secure committing capital because land-related costs and legal risks can be quantified more clearly.
The article links SOE privatization to an opportunity for Vietnam’s stock market to improve its standing internationally. It says the upgrade to a secondary emerging market requires depth, liquidity, and diverse stock offerings.
In March 2026, FTSE Russell announced a plan to upgrade Vietnam from frontier to Secondary Emerging Market, effective September 21, 2026. The article attributes this to coordinated efforts among the government, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Securities Commission to remove barriers to margin trading and implement a global brokerage model.
Expected capital inflows are cited as about $1.5 billion from index funds, with total inflows potentially reaching $5-6 billion if active funds are included. In an optimistic scenario, HSBC projects inflows could reach $10.4 billion.
However, the article notes the market remains concentrated in finance (37%) and real estate (19%). To sustain long-term appeal and reduce volatility, it argues Vietnam needs large-cap entrants in energy, telecommunications, and heavy industry—areas currently dominated by SOEs.
It also describes a longer-term aspiration for an MSCI upgrade, which would require stricter foreign ownership (FOL) and transparency standards. Privatization and divestment are presented as a way to raise free float, a key metric used by global index providers. The article further states that if reforms are implemented in a coordinated manner, including establishing a Central Counterpart (CCP) system by late 2026, Vietnam could meet up to 17 of 18 MSCI criteria.
The article concludes that selling state capital is not only a financial requirement but an overarching strategy to restructure the economy. It outlines three priorities: first, solving the capital problem for infrastructure and stabilizing the foreign exchange balance, with Vietnam needing more than $67 billion for the high-speed rail and renewable energy projects; second, improving governance and productivity under Resolution 79-NQ/TW by shifting the state toward creating and guiding rather than broadly owning; and third, modernizing the stock market by leveraging the 2026 emerging-market upgrade to attract global capital through higher-quality assets, scale, and transparency.
It argues that SOEs after privatization are well positioned to supply the market with high-quality assets, while the government’s ability to overcome land-valuation and legal hurdles—supported by the 2024 Land Law and updated stock-market regulations—will determine whether the transition can be executed transparently and efficiently.
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