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In today’s context, “strategic technology” refers to core technologies that have a decisive role in a country’s development capacity and status. These are also areas with strong diffusion potential, driving many sectors of the economy and helping to solve key development problems.
Over the past period, policies such as Resolution 57-NQ/TW and related regulations have laid an important foundation for developing science, technology, and innovation. However, the biggest challenge now is how to translate those orientations into concrete actions.
In other words, the core issue is to identify the path and the appropriate mechanism to move from the current starting point to the goal of developing strategic technologies in the future, thereby narrowing the gap with developed economies.
To narrow the gap, Vietnam needs to understand the concept of “catching up.” Essentially, catching up can only occur when a country accelerates faster. While leading countries continue to advance, they do not stand still. Therefore, Vietnam must look squarely at its actual capacity and choose a suitable path.
From the perspective presented in the article, Vietnam has several favorable foundations to participate in technology development, including in new areas such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors.
Yet along with opportunity comes pressure. In a context where nations push ahead with digital transformation and the development of new technologies such as AI and semiconductors, Vietnam faces a mindset of “FOMO”—fear of being left behind. As a result, concepts like AI or semiconductors may be widely mentioned without full understanding and substantive deployment.
Regarding the technology development path, the article argues Vietnam is not deviating from its course, as its ability to monitor and update global trends is solid. However, the biggest obstacle is the FOMO mentality. The proposed approach is to progress step by step by selecting targets and starting points that align with reality.
Instead of pursuing overly ambitious goals, Vietnam should prioritize feasible tasks. Choosing the right starting point helps conserve resources and builds trust with investors and society that Vietnam can deliver—reducing discouragement. The article emphasizes that “easy” choices must also fit into the overall development strategy rather than remain disjointed, short-term actions.
In the long term, the goal cannot stop at contract manufacturing or outsourcing. Under the direction of the High-Tech Law and core technology development strategies, Vietnam should progressively move toward technological self-reliance. The article outlines a sequence: begin with operating technologies transferred from partners, then proceed to repair, upgrade, and ultimately to mastery.
Mastering technology is presented as delivering three benefits: meeting domestic demand, enhancing prestige to attract international cooperation, and reducing dependence on imports—saving resources for the economy.
To realize this objective, the article highlights the importance of roles for both government and business. It notes that Vietnam currently has only a handful of large tech groups, but achieving breakthroughs requires a broader ecosystem involving dozens or even hundreds of tech enterprises.
The article argues that the era of focusing on “screwdriver” technology is over. The emphasis should shift to core areas such as big data and artificial intelligence—described as foundations that determine national competitiveness.
Vietnam is urged to recalibrate its thinking to support new enterprises, especially startups with a vision. The government is described as needing to accept investment risk: some projects may fail, but even two or three successful outcomes would be worthwhile. The article also notes that even if state-funded researchers later work outside the public sector and move into private enterprise, this still contributes to society.
It further states that beyond setting directions, the government must take concrete actions through guidance, strategic support, and funding for breakthrough ideas. The article suggests that large investment funds with clear disbursement mechanisms and accountability could help generate a wave of businesspeople and scientists engaged in research and product development.
To generate societal momentum, the article says the state should not concentrate resources solely on a few large groups. Support should also extend to small and medium enterprises and individuals with real capability. When success stories emerge from small ventures backed by the state, the spillover effect can be strong by reinforcing the belief that others can do it as well.
The article states that Vietnam’s scientific community has a solid foundation but remains heavy on theory. To address this, it calls for more opportunities for researchers to participate in international forums and for researchers to be embedded in real production environments. Researchers should be immersed in factories and work directly with machinery to develop technology that fits practical realities.
It also notes that the semiconductor industry is highly complex and cannot be developed simply by importing assembly machinery. It requires advanced operational capability in production and long-term experience, calling for a synchronized ecosystem where engineers, technicians, and scientists work closely together.
The article cites TSMC as a concrete example. It says founder Morris Chang spent many years working in the U.S. manufacturing sector, accumulating production management, semiconductor technology, and international cooperation experience. After more than 25 years at Texas Instruments, he returned to Taiwan and founded TSMC in 1987 with government support. The article uses this story to argue that success in high technology often comes from learning in advanced environments combined with building a comprehensive system—from knowledge and human resources to management thinking—supported by the state to move gradually toward technology self-reliance.
The article presents additional lessons from successful nations. It points to Japan’s 19th-century reform, which set the goal of “learning from the West, catching up with the West, and surpassing the West.” It says Japan translated knowledge from major languages such as English, French, and German into Japanese while maintaining the philosophy of “Western civilization, Japanese culture,” absorbing technology without losing its own identity.
It also describes Taiwan’s approach as starting from basic foundations: early manufacturing focused on simple contract work, then capacity was upgraded and moved toward higher-value stages. Through this strategy, Taiwan built leading technology groups such as TSMC and engaged deeply in the global ecosystem alongside companies including Nvidia. The article concludes that technology development is not a single-industry issue and requires societal consensus and coordination between the state, enterprises, and the scientific community.
Finally, it emphasizes that human resources and discipline are foundational for success, arguing that technology and products originate from real needs and that disciplined execution helps convert those needs into effective and sustainable solutions.
In summary, the article argues that government policy plays a decisive role in technology development. It highlights discovering, valuing, and rewarding talent, together with visionary leadership, as key to unlocking long-term technology development.
It concludes with the idea that small changes accumulated in the right direction can create a turning point for an entire nation.
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