ASEAN energy crisis reveals structural vulnerabilities in regional self-reliance

The Hormuz Strait blockade has exposed a deeper challenge for Southeast Asia than an immediate energy supply disruption: structural limits on the region’s ability to be self-reliant in a crisis it cannot shape, and evidence that ASEAN has little influence over the course or outcome of the conflict.

Six weeks after the most severe energy disruption in modern history, ASEAN countries have rolled out a range of response measures. Indonesia froze fuel prices, expanded subsidies, and adopted flexible working arrangements to reduce consumption. The Philippines declared an energy emergency. Thailand restarted coal-fired plants and allocated diesel distribution by quotas. Vietnam halted crude oil exports and accelerated its ethanol blending program.

Across the region, governments responded quickly and pragmatically. However, no ASEAN country could influence the crisis itself—none had meaningful sway over the decision to block Hormuz, the terms of a ceasefire, or the conditions for traffic to resume.

Hormuz closure highlights exposure in ASEAN’s energy corridor

The region’s most important energy corridor—through which more than half of ASEAN’s oil imports pass—has been shut by a conflict in which Southeast Asian countries have no voice. The implications extend beyond the immediate emergency.

For years, ASEAN’s energy policy discussions have emphasized “resilience,” including diversification of supply, renewable energy targets, regional grid integration, and building strategic reserves. These are described as necessary and serious goals. Yet the Hormuz crisis has revealed a hard reality: resilience, as currently implemented, is mainly designed to absorb shocks rather than reduce dependence on the conditions that create them.

Structural risks and the role of external security decisions

A central paradox in the current situation is the role of the United States. For decades, the US has been viewed as an implicit guarantor of sea freedom through key security arrangements on global sea lanes—an important foundation for the ASEAN growth model built on trade. By 2026, however, the US is described as initiating military action against Iran and proclaiming a naval blockade, making the closure of Hormuz more severe.

For ASEAN, this is framed as a structurally rooted risk when the region depends on a security order it cannot control. Indonesia is cited as a typical example.

Indonesia’s exposure and fiscal pressure

Indonesia has been a net oil importer since 2003. It consumes about 1.5 million barrels per day but produces less than 700,000 barrels, with domestic reserves enough to meet less than 20 days. About a quarter of Indonesia’s oil imports pass through Hormuz.

The article links higher oil prices to fiscal strain: each USD uptick in oil prices widens the budget deficit by roughly $400 million, while rupiah depreciation against the USD increases pressure further.

Indonesia’s response is described as an effective political solution with historical roots, keeping fuel subsidies at about $0.60 per liter while Brent crude rose above $118 per barrel. But the approach is characterized as “fiscal absorption,” where the state budget acts as a shock absorber rather than a shield. As the crisis drags on, the available room for maneuver is expected to shrink.

Energy transition plans face a shock-driven return to fossil fuels

The necessity to revert to coal is presented as the clearest proof of vulnerability. Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have restarted or maximized coal-fired power capacity to compensate for gas and oil shortfalls, even as they pursue energy transition paths.

The transition program is described as real, but still implemented on a fossil-fuel-based foundation that remains vulnerable to external shocks. When shocks occur, the article says, that foundation quickly returns to the center.

ASEAN’s limited leverage amid geopolitical shifts

The article points to what it calls a collective silence. As an organization, ASEAN has not issued a meaningful statement about Hormuz, has not proposed a common diplomatic stance, and has not used significant leverage—individually or collectively—against the conflicting parties.

In contrast, other actors are described as taking steps: China vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution related to Hormuz; India adjusted its entire energy diplomacy strategy; South Korea activated an emergency economic task force. ASEAN’s focus is described as centered on measures such as fuel vouchers and remote work.

The article argues that the gap between the region’s economic dependence and its geopolitical weight has become clearer than ever.

Impact and policy implications

The article does not frame the solution as requiring military intervention or abandoning non-aligned policy. Instead, it argues that energy security cannot be understood only as supply management.

It concludes that ASEAN’s weakness is mainly political rather than technical: the region bears consequences of decisions by great powers over which it has no influence. In this view, resilience without self-rule becomes adaptation to conditions imposed by others.

Policy implications are described as not new, but the urgency is said to be different. Accelerating renewable energy development, building regional storage infrastructure, and diversifying supply routes are presented as essential steps, and the crisis is described as potentially catalyzing investments discussed for years but not yet achieved.

However, the article adds that these measures may not be enough without deeper discussion of whether ASEAN’s institutional structure can form a common stance when geopolitical forces shape the region’s energy security. While Hormuz is expected to end, the structural vulnerability it exposes is described as unlikely to disappear.