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RKLB stock has surged almost 250% over the past year, even as Rocket Lab has reported hundreds of millions in losses and postponed its flagship next-generation rocket. The company has not achieved a single profitable year since going public, yet investors appear largely unfazed.
The article argues that Rocket Lab’s valuation may look stretched when assessed using traditional methods focused only on revenue and earnings for 2025 or 2026. It contends that Rocket Lab and its backers are instead positioning for a much longer timeline, encouraging investors to look beyond 2027 and toward 2035 and 2045.
The central premise is that the value of Rocket Lab’s business should be viewed in the context of building the orbital infrastructure that will underpin global communications over the coming decades—rather than focusing narrowly on near-term quarterly results.
Rocket Lab’s Electron rocket is described as the second most frequently launched U.S. rocket each year, accounting for 64% of all U.S. non-SpaceX orbital launches. The article places this within a broader launch market dominated by SpaceX, alongside other established players such as Arianespace, ULA, CASC, and ISRO, which collectively launch payloads worth billions of dollars annually.
It also characterizes Rocket Lab as a relatively small New Zealand-based company that nonetheless holds a clear position as a “number two” in the U.S. market, and suggests that its stock performance and risk profile should be evaluated against other aerospace participants.
The piece argues that building rockets takes time and cannot be rushed without risking mission success. It claims that Rocket Lab’s valuation—described as $40 billion, $100 billion, and potentially $150 billion or more—would only be supportable if investors are willing to underwrite a far-off future, such as 2035.
According to the article, the global space launch services sector was valued at $21.2 billion in 2025 and is expected to reach $70.6 billion by 2035 (Precedence Research). It adds that the larger satellite market was $362 billion in 2025 and is projected to grow to $780 billion by 2035 (Precedence Research).
Rocket Lab’s Space Systems segment is described as targeting parts of both markets, including satellites, components, sensors, and on-orbit management.
The article then presents a scenario: if Rocket Lab captures 10% of the launch market and 5% of the satellite systems market, it would generate $7 billion from launches (10% of $70 billion) and $39 billion from satellite systems (5% of $780 billion), totaling more than $46 billion in combined annual revenue. It contrasts this with a current run rate of slightly more than $600 million.
Using assumed margins of 25% to 30% as reusability evolves, the article estimates annual profits of $11–14 billion. It then compares this to a valuation framework: if stocks like MSFT, AAPL, and NFLX trade at 35 times profits, the implied valuation could be around $400 billion—described as roughly a tenfold increase from the current valuation of $36 billion.
The article argues that Neutron is intended to disrupt a medium-lift launch sector that it says is “almost exclusively” dominated by SpaceX. It frames this as a strategic limitation for Amazon’s Project Kuiper, the U.S. government, and commercial constellation operators, and says Neutron is designed to reduce that dependency.
It also claims Rocket Lab already earns 67% of its revenue from satellite components and sensors, which it says represent 74% of the company’s current order backlog. The article interprets this as evidence that Rocket Lab profits from the constellations that would eventually use its rockets, highlighting vertical integration as a competitive advantage that rivals cannot easily replicate.
In support of its long-term thesis, the article cites several figures: Rocket Lab’s backlog reached $1.85 billion, up 73% year over year. It also states that revenue per Electron launch increased from $7 million to over $10 million within a year.
The article challenges the idea that Neutron’s postponement automatically signals excessive risk. It argues that the more fundamental risk is over-reliance on a single launch provider and the concentration of geopolitical and commercial influence that could follow.
It concludes by noting that the path for growth stocks is rarely linear and that investors may need to balance high-conviction positions with broader portfolio protection against volatility. It references an “HQ Portfolio” approach that selects 30 high-conviction stocks and claims historical outperformance versus benchmarks such as the S&P 500, S&P Mid-cap, and Russell 2000.
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