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Recently, estimates of the demand for trillions of US dollars for Vietnam’s growth over the coming decades have attracted broad attention. The figure has prompted two common reactions: skepticism about feasibility—“where will we source the resources?”—and the view that it signals a capital-poor economy. However, the article argues that the key issue is not the size of the number, but how it is understood.
“Trillions of US dollars” are not funds required immediately. Instead, they are described as total investment demand over a long horizon, potentially 10–20 years. The spending would cover infrastructure, energy, urbanization, digital transformation, and upgrading industry—essentially the cost of shifting from a low-cost growth model to one driven by productivity and technology.
The article cites recent estimates that to sustain high growth, total social investment may need to reach around 40% of GDP per year, equivalent to hundreds of billions of US dollars. If such investment levels are maintained for many years, the cumulative total can reach the scale of trillions of US dollars. The discussion is framed as particularly relevant because high growth targets carry implications not only for economic performance, but also for stability and development status.
A central principle highlighted is that an economy cannot grow rapidly while consuming all it produces. Growth requires accumulation, and accumulation requires accepting that part of current income is not consumed.
Capital, the article notes, does not appear automatically. It is the result of a choice to delay consumption—meaning that each unit of today’s investment capital is consumption moved from yesterday.
Even when the economy saves, the article says capital does not necessarily distribute evenly. In practice, capital tends to concentrate in areas with higher productivity and profitability. This creates a reinforcing loop: more capital raises productivity; higher productivity increases profits; and higher profits attract more capital. As a result, accumulation can expand, but often in specific areas rather than across the whole economy.
The article argues that not all sectors participate equally in the “flow of capital.” Typically, large enterprises or sectors linked to foreign direct investment (FDI) are positioned at the center of accumulation, while small enterprises and workers are more likely to sit at the periphery or outside it. These peripheral groups are described as facing relatively easier access to capital and fewer financial constraints in the areas that receive more investment.
Looking at capital sources, the article states that foreign capital—whether as FDI or other financial flows—often provides capital while also being linked to technology, management, and integration into global value chains. It suggests that a significant portion of modern capital accumulation occurs within this sector.
As a consequence, the article says GDP growth may be visible domestically, but the accumulation of assets—profits, technology, and intellectual property—does not necessarily remain domestic. It may instead concentrate among a small number of players. Meanwhile, the domestic private sector, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, is described as continuing to face constraints related to capital, technology, and deeper value-chain access.
In short, the article concludes that growth does not automatically translate into domestic asset accumulation.
The ambition for high growth, the article argues, is therefore not only about speed but also about structure—where growth is accumulated and how it is shared. This is used to explain a “familiar paradox”: the economy may grow strongly, yet many domestic firms and workers may not feel the benefits of accumulation.
The article also highlights another paradox. To grow rapidly, the economy must accumulate robustly, but strong accumulation can coincide with rising inequality, at least in the short run. It notes that when the profit share rises relative to wages, savings and investment capacity can improve, but social pressure may also increase. If inequality surpasses a threshold, it can undermine the growth motive.
International experience is cited to argue that there is no fast-growth path that is entirely smooth. China is referenced as achieving high accumulation for decades while restraining household consumption relative to investment. Vietnam is described as facing a similar challenge in a different context: a more open society, higher expectations of equity, and less policy space to induce accumulation as before.
As pressure to sustain high growth rises, the article says capital tends to flow toward areas that generate the fastest growth, are easiest to measure, and are least risky. This is described as especially likely when growth targets are high and short-term results become key policy indicators.
While such dynamics can support near-term growth targets, the article warns they can also concentrate the capital-distribution structure over time. Without mechanisms to broaden participation of other sectors, accumulation can become increasingly “closed” within core areas of the economy.
Overall, the article concludes that the “thousands of trillions” problem is not primarily about absolute capital scarcity. Instead, it is about who stays in the capital flow and who is left out. The final question, it says, is whether the growth achieved is accumulated domestically and shared equitably.
Assoc. Prof. Truong Quang Thong (School of Business, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City)
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